They found that Soviets were, in fact, significantly behind the US in development of a workable ICBM and that the Soviets were building up a strategic bomber force but were devoting most of their resources to missile production. Within a few months, CIA photointerpreters had dispelled both the missile gap and the bomber gap. The first CORONA images were grainy and of limited utility, but quality–and intelligence value–improved rapidly on succeeding missions. Unsuccessful launches, orbits not achieved, camera malfunctions, spacecraft errors, and missed recoveries plagued the program.įinally, on 18 August 1960, all systems on CORONA Mission XIV operated successfully! This remarkable technological achievement revolutionized the intelligence world by returning from space more photographic coverage of the Soviet Union in a single mission than in all previous U-2 missions combined. The first 13 missions failed to return any useable imagery. The program’s goals were daunting: launch a large camera into earth orbit, photograph specific points and areas on the earth’s surface, parachute a capsule of exposed film to earth, snag the capsule in midair over the Pacific Ocean, develop the film, and search the images for answers to the nation’s pressing intelligence questions. Cloaked in secrecy, it was known to the public as a scientific research program named DISCOVERER. The CORONA Program began as a joint CIA-Air Force effort in the late 1950s. President Eisenhower halted all U-2 overflights of the USSR when the Soviets shot down an American U-2 and captured its CIA pilot Francis Gary Powers near Sverdlovsk on.
#Image bucket of corona crack
The US Intelligence Community reflected this uncertainty in wild overestimates of Soviet bomber and missile production–the so-called “bomber gap” and “missile gap”–and forecast that the US was falling behind in the nuclear arms race and in real danger of nuclear attack.īetween 19, imagery from 24 U-2 photoreconnaissance aircraft missions over the Soviet Union opened up a crack in the Soviets’ armor, but the crack was a small one and it closed before a single ICBM base could be found. The US frequently sighted Soviet strategic bombers and had evidence of Soviet missile test programs but lacked the means to get a comprehensive look at overall Soviet strategic deployments–the US did not know how many operational ICBMs and bombers the Soviets had and where they were deployed. Although the US knew the Soviets had ambitious programs to develop and deploy intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and bombers, the US knew little about the scope or success of Soviet efforts. The 1950s was a time of great uncertainty for the US regarding the Soviet Union’s budding strategic nuclear forces.
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